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“Plus que jamais nécessaires”: Cultural Relations,
Nationalism and the State in the Canada-Québec-
France Triangle, 1945–19601
DAVID MEREN
Abstract
Charles de Gaulle’s cry of “Vive le Québec libre!” during his 1967 visit to
Montreal was the product of the convergence of Canadian, Quebecois and
Gaullist nationalist reactions to preponderant US influence and globalization’s
rise after 1945. The dynamic was especially pronounced in the cultural sphere.
Consistent with the trend towards increased transnational exchanges, cultural
relations grew in the Canada-Quebec-France triangle in the fifteen years after
the Second World War. Quebec neo-nationalism’s rise was accompanied by a
greater appreciation of France as an ally as Quebec strove to preserve its fran-
cophone identity. Such preoccupations corresponded to French apprehensions
about the ramifications on France at home and abroad of American cultural
‘imperialism.’ In addition to nationalist concerns in France and Quebec,
English Canadian nationalists were preoccupied with American influences on
the Canadian identity. If these three interacting nationalist reactions shared a
preoccupation about American cultural power and Americanization that
encouraged a growing state involvement in culture and promoted greater
exchanges, the differences between them also helped set the stage for the tem-
pestuous triangular relationship of the 1960s.
Résumé
Le « Vive le Québec libre! » lancé par Charles de Gaulle lors de sa visite de
1967 à Montréal est le produit de la convergence de réactions nationalistes
canadiennes, québécoises et gaullistes face à la montée de l’influence des
États-Unis et de la mondialisation après 1945. Cette dynamique fut particu-
lièrement prononcée dans la sphère culturelle. Dans la foulée de la hausse des
échanges transnationaux, les relations culturelles s’étaient intensifiées dans le
1 I wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for its financial support,
as well as Carman Miller, Graham Carr, Ryan Touhey, Andrew Burtch, Sean Mills, and the
anonymous reviewers and editorial board of the Journal of the Canadian Historical
Association for their valued assistance in the preparation of this article.
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triangle Canada–Québec–France au cours des quinze années suivant la Seconde
Guerre mondiale. La montée du néonationalisme québécois s’était accom-
pagnée d’une meilleure appréciation de la France à titre d’alliée, au moment
même où le Québec tentait de préserver son identité francophone. Ce genre de
préoccupations rejoignait les appréhensions françaises quant aux ramifications,
à la fois en France, sur le continent et à l’étranger, de « l’impérialisme » cultu-
rel américain. Les nationalistes canadiens-anglais s’ajoutaient aux Français et
aux Québécois, qui se souciaient pour leur part des influences américaines sur
l’identité canadienne. Ces trois courants nationalistes partageaient un malaise
par rapport à l’hégémonie culturelle américaine et à l’américanisation et
demandèrent, parfois en interaction, l’intervention croissante de l’État et l’in-
tensification de leurs échanges mutuels. Cependant, les différences entre ces
courants ont aussi préparé le terrain aux relations triangulaires tumultueuses
des années 1960.
Afuror arose in 1946 over what French-Canadian nationalists charged wasthe corrupting influence on Québec’s education system of two French-
sponsored colleges in Montréal. From its editorial pages, Le Devoir urged
French Canada to defend itself against what it characterized as a fifth column
of foreign secularism and Masonic elements.2 Just two decades later, however,
the newspaper’s reaction to French cultural influence had shifted; it reported
approvingly in 1965 on the visit to Paris of Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Québec’s
Minister of Education, to sign an agreement with the French government estab-
lishing a vast programme of cooperation touching on every aspect of Québec’s
education system.3
In addition to demonstrating Québec’s broader evolution, not least in terms
of attitudes in the province regarding contacts with France, the contrast between
these two episodes draws attention to the growing state involvement in cultural
affairs in the Canada-Québec-France triangle after World War II. Intersecting
nationalist reactions to American cultural power and worries over the socio-
economic consequences of “Americanization” led to pressure on both sides of
the Atlantic for a greater governmental role in culture, so that cultural relations
in the triangle shifted increasingly from the private to the public sphere. More
broadly, the acceleration of transnational exchanges and interdependence after
1945 that coincided with preponderant American power and heralding what is
now referred to as globalization called into question the fundamental unit of the
2 Luc Roussel, Les Relations culturelles du Québec avec la France, 1920–1965 (Ph.D. diss.,
Université Laval, 1983), 193–4. The controversy erupted following the accidental release of a
Free French report that, in addition to suggesting the quality of education offered by the
French-sponsored colleges was superior to their Quebec counterparts, intimated Collège Marie
de France’s Catholic character was temporary, the aim being “libérer les esprits.”
3 “Le Québec signe sa 1ère entente internationale,” Le Devoir (27 February 1965), 1.
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international system — the state — and the bases of ethnic, religious, and
national identity. Governments in Ottawa, Québec City, and Paris were com-
pelled to contend with this challenge of mediating between the local and the
global, the particular and the common, the parochial and the cosmopolitan, so
that the protection and promotion of a certain conceptualization of national iden-
tity took on heightened resonance in their relations with the outside world.
As the twentieth century unfolded and French-Canadian nationalism grap-
pled with the challenges accompanying Québec’s industrialization and
urbanization, anxieties grew over the spread of “Anglo-Saxon,” notably
American, cultural influence, perceived as a threat to French Canada’s cultural
survival. The traditionalist variant of French-Canadian nationalism, with its
emphasis on a more conservative brand of Catholicism, ambivalence for liber-
alism, and hostility to left-wing ideas was increasingly in eclipse after World
War II. The shift toward a more Québec-centric “neo-nationalism,” combined
with proliferating calls for a more activist Québec state that would safeguard
and nurture the province’s majority francophone identity, led to increasing
interest in cultural relations with France as a necessary and effective inocula-
tion against American influences.4 Interest in forging links with postwar France
was especially pronounced among the more progressive, reform-minded ele-
ments of the rising generation of Québec neo-nationalists, who took the
government of Maurice Duplessis and the Church to task for failing to respond
effectively to the challenges of modernization. They also decried what they
viewed as traditional nationalists’ enabling of this situation.5
4 To be sure, there existed overlap in the thinking and even some of the prescriptions of the var-
ious strands of French-Canadian and Québec nationalism. Xavier Gélinas, in La droite
intellectuelle québécoise et la Révolution tranquille (Montréal: Les Presses de l’Université
Laval, 2007), 139–40, 333, notes that adherents of the traditionalist variant of French-
Canadian nationalism shared many positions with the rising generation of Québec neo- and
left-nationalists. He is quick to point out, however, that there remained substantial differences:
for example, the future of francophones outside of Québec remained a priority, the question of
self-determination was not treated as sacrosanct, the pessimism about Québec that neo-nation-
alist historians such as Maurice Séguin espoused was rejected, and Québec’s Catholic heritage
was given greater prominence. For additional discussions of the evolution of Québec nation-
alism(s), see Pascale Ryan, Penser la nation: la Ligue d’action nationale, 1917–1960
(Montréal: Leméac, 2006); Michael Gauvreau, The Catholic Origins of Quebec’s Quiet
Revolution, 1931–1970 (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005);
Dominique Foisy-Geoffroy, Esdras Minville: nationalisme économique et catholicisme social
au Québec durant l’entre-deux-guerres (Sillery, Québec: Septentrion, 2004); Michael D.
Behiels, Prelude to Quebec’s Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism,
1945–1960 (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1985).
5 Gélinas, 64, 139, 310. The relationship between traditional French-Canadian nationalist élites
and the Duplessis government was complicated. Although traditional nationalists were
increasingly annoyed with Duplessis’ passive, defensive approach, his government was con-
sidered the lesser of two evils since it at least preached a defensive form of Québec autonomy
compared to what was condemned as the “gauchiste” anti-nationalism of the Québec Liberals.
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The evolving Québec nationalist interest in France coincided with Paris’
efforts to cultivate relations to ensure the rayonnement of French culture in the
face of American cultural power, including in Canada, and Québec especially.
An anti-Americanism that crossed France’s deep political divides was evident
well before World War II as the protection and promotion of the fait français in
the Hexagon and beyond became a priority for the French political class and
intelligentsia. The growth of the French state’s involvement in culture after
1945 was intended to ensure not only that this could serve as a vehicle to com-
pensate for France’s diminished international stature, but to safeguard in the
face of preponderant American power a certain conceptualization of France and
“Frenchness” that was presented as antonymous to the “American Way of
Life.”6
To these nationalist concerns in France and Québec about Americanization
were added a growing English-Canadian preoccupation with American cultural
influence. Already apparent in the interwar period, this nationalist reaction with
its roots in the traditional Tory Canadian hostility toward the United States
intensified after World War II. English-Canadian nationalist sentiment, exacer-
bated by multiplying questions about the country’s identity as Canada shifted
definitively from the British to the American sphere of influence, pushed
Ottawa to increase its activity in the cultural sphere after 1945; beyond a gen-
eral concern to facilitate Canadian cultural development and promote national
unity, this comprised a growing appreciation of Canada’s francophone popula-
tion as a point of differentiation from the United States that resulted in a trend
toward federal efforts to inculcate and project internationally a biculturalism
that was perceived as the best available bulwark against Americanization.7
Exploring the evolution of cultural relations in the Canada-Québec-France
triangle in the 15 years preceding the Quiet Revolution is useful for a number
of reasons. First, it brings greater light to bear on a dimension of the triangular
relationship that has tended to be neglected in the historiography relative to the
geo-political and economic aspect of events, but that is nevertheless intrinsic to
understanding the evolving relationship.8 Indeed, if official Canada-France
relations were generally anaemic and even deteriorated in the 15 years after
World War II, the cultural dimension of the triangular relationship underwent
6 Philippe Roger, The American Enemy: A Story of French Anti-Americanism, trans. Sharon
Bowman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), chap. 12. See also, Richard F. Kuisel,
Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley and LosAngeles: University
of California Press, 1993), chaps. 1–5.
7 José Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945–1971
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006).
8 David Meren, Strange Allies: Canada-Quebec-France Triangular Relations, 1944–1970
(Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 2007). See chapters 2-5 for discussion of the geo-political and
economic dimensions of the postwar triangular relationship.
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much more substantive development.9 Second, given the fact Charles de Gaulle
was not in office during these years, it permits a widening of the frame of analy-
sis beyond the “de Gaulle-centric” approach that has marked the historiography,
tending to obscure the broader trends at play, and giving rise to the erroneous
impression that the triangular tensions erupted almost spontaneously in the
1960s.10 Expanding the period under examination is also consistent with recent
trends in Québec historiography questioning the orthodox narrative of the Quiet
Revolution and introducing greater nuance into the decades leading up to this
tumultuous period.11 Pre-1960 Québec was far more complex than it often has
been portrayed in accounts of the Canada-Québec-France triangle, not least in
terms of attitudes in the province toward France. External influences, not least
those of France, presaged the Quiet Revolution and were instrumental in
Québec’s development, and thus are critical to understanding the evolving tri-
angular dynamic.12
The growing pressure for and examples of government involvement in cul-
tural affairs sowed the seeds for conflict on the Canadian side of the Atlantic,
aggravating latent constitutional tensions and the relationship between the
9 Notable exceptions include Roussel, and Nathalie François-Richard, La France et le Québec,
1945–1967, dans les archives du MAE (Ph.D. diss., Université de Paris VIII, 1998). Even at
this, Roussel’s work was written when the French foreign ministry records were still unavail-
able; conversely, Richard’s work is based principally on these French sources. Renée Lescop,
Le pari québécois du général de Gaulle (Montréal: Boréal Express, 1981) offers a brief dis-
cussion of the post-war growth of cultural exchanges, but the focus remains on the formal
cultural relations of the 1960s. Dale Thomson, Vive le Québec libre! (Toronto: Deneau, 1988)
refers to an increasing French-Canadian interest for France in the postwar period owing to
advances in communications and economic prosperity, but offers little detail or evidence to
support the claim. J.F. Bosher, The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967–1997 (Montréal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999) acknowledges the proliferation of cultural
exchanges; however, the analysis is refracted through the prism of his argument regarding a
Gaullist imperialist conspiracy, instead of seeing the trend as consistent with the broader post-
1945 growth of transnational exchanges. The result is that the work too often intimates that all
cultural links were politically-motivated (i.e. malevolent).
10 An example of this “de Gaulle-centric analysis” is Thomson, which after exploring the war
years, jumps immediately to the 1960s, with only passing references to the 1946–1958 period.
Similarly, Lescop is preoccupied chiefly with de Gaulle’s 1967 visit and attitudes.
11 For example, see Sean Mills, The Empire Within: Montreal, the Sixties, and the Forging of a
Radical Imagination (Ph.D. diss., Queen’s University, 2007) and Gélinas, Ryan, Gauvreau,
and Foisy-Geoffroy. See also E.-Martin Meunier and Jean-Philippe Warren, Sortir de “la
Grande Noirceur,” L’horizon “personnaliste” de la Révolution tranquille (Sillery, Québec:
Septentrion, 2002).
12 Yvan Lamonde, Allégeances et dépendances, L’histoire d’une ambivalence identitaire
(Québec: Éditions Nota bene, 2001); Gérard Bouchard, Entre l’Ancien et le Nouveau Monde,
Le Québec comme population neuve et culture fondatrice (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press,
1996); Michael Oliver, The Passionate Debate: The Social and Political Ideas of Quebec
Nationalism, 1920–1945 (Montréal: Véhicule Press, 1991).
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country’s two principal linguistic communities. The growth of federal cultural
activity in the 1950s provoked jurisdictional conflict between Ottawa and
Québec City, as Québec nationalists interpreted the federal government’s cul-
tural initiatives as an encroachment on provincial jurisdiction that constituted a
serious threat to Québec’s autonomy and thus French Canada’s survival. The
result was nationalist calls from across the political and ideological spectrum
for the Duplessis Government to take a more active approach to counter the
federal initiatives. This rivalry over cultural affairs, with France implicated
increasingly in the inter-governmental dispute, would prove to be a crucial con-
tributing factor to the emergence of the Canada-Québec-France triangular
tensions of the 1960s. These were manifested most dramatically by de Gaulle’s
visit in 1967 and his cry of “Vive le Québec libre” from the balcony of
Montréal’s Hôtel de Ville. As such, these triangular tensions can be understood
as the result of a clash of nationalist responses that were shaped by domestic
circumstances intersecting with postwar international realities, notably the pre-
ponderance of American influence — geo-political, economic, and cultural —
and more broadly, the proliferation of transnational exchanges and interdepen-
dence that were the antecedents of globalization. All three nationalist reactions
shared a preoccupation about Americanization, but this led to conflict as much
as it did cooperation.
*****
The late nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of “cultural internation-
alism,” predicated on a belief that cultural exchanges would create a solid
foundation for international peace and prosperity. Private philanthropic orga-
nizations, such as the Carnegie Foundation, to name only one example, strove
to realize this vision. Although the carnage of World War I stood as a bloody
rejoinder to the idealism underpinning cultural internationalism, the enhanced
prominence of cultural diplomacy in the wake of the conflict was evident in
the establishment of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation
as part of the League of Nations. The interwar crises and World War II accel-
erated states’ appropriation of cultural activities, so that cultural diplomacy
took on even greater importance, as the founding in 1945 of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) under-
scored.13
France was a pioneer of cultural diplomacy, employing it to maximize its
international influence. The quasi-private efforts in the years following the
13 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1997), 51–130; also, Mike Featherstone, ed., Global Culture: Nationalism,
Globalization and Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1990); Peter J. Taylor, “Izations of
the World: Americanization, Modernization and Globalization,” in Demystifying Globaliza-
tion, Colin Hay and David Marsh, eds. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
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Franco-Prussian War, such as Alliance Française and the Comité Amérique-
France, presaged the gradual incorporation of culture into French foreign
policy in the interwar period.14 Paris attached even greater importance to cul-
tural diplomacy after 1945 as a means to compensate for its diminished
geo-political stature and to raise a French voice in a world dominated by super-
powers. This strategy was reflected in the establishment of a distinct cultural
relations division in the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE). Whereas
France signed 11 “intellectual cooperation” agreements in the interwar period,
it concluded 75 cultural relations agreements between 1945 and 1960, a num-
ber only slightly second to that of the United States.15
The increased stature of culture in French foreign policy was reflected in
Paris’ innovation of appointing “cultural counsellors” to 14 of its diplomatic
posts, including its Ottawa embassy. Not surprisingly, French Canada was
accorded a high priority, with the ambassador, Jean de Hauteclocque, asserting
that the survival in the Americas of a hardy, prolific, faithful, and influential
“élément français” was an extremely useful advantage for France. At the Quai
d’Orsay, the view was that Québec and France should cooperate for the rayon-
nement of French culture in North America by virtue of their common
language, as well as shared religious and intellectual traditions.16
French efforts were by no means limited to Québec. The MAE acknowl-
edged the value of targeting francophones outside Québec, notably the Acadian
community, and English Canada was considered especially promising since it
did not harbour the complex and often ambivalent feelings for France present
among Québec francophones.17 France’s ambassador, Hubert Guérin, wel-
comed the release in 1951 of the Massey Report on Canada’s cultural life as an
opportunity for Paris to adapt its efforts to Canadian objectives and enhance
links that would prove useful when Canada emerged as one of the great Western
powers.18 His reaction reflected Paris’ desire for a Canadian interlocutor with
14 François Roche and Bernard Pigniau, Histoire de diplomatie culturelle des origines à 1995
(Paris: La Documentation française, 1995).
15 François-Richard, 47–8; William R. Pendergast, “UNESCO and French Cultural Relations,
1945–1970,” International Organization 30, no. 3 (Summer 1976): 454–83; Roussel, 152–3.
16 Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (hereafter MAE), Séries B, Amérique, Sous-
séries Canada, vol. 2 — Telegram from de Hauteclocque to MAE, 28 February 1945; Ibid.,
vol. 53 — Letter from de Hauteclocque to MAE, Amérique, 6 October 1945, Collaboration
industrielle et culturelle entre la France et le Canada, Relations Industrielles Franco-
Canadiennes; François-Richard, 45.
17 MAE, vol. 63 — Relations Culturelles Franco-Canadiennes, 5 Octobre 1945; Roussel, 191.
Jean de Hauteclocque announced his intention to promote Franco-Canadian cultural relations
“autant avec le Canada anglais que le Canada français.”
18 Ibid., vol. 62 — Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Relations Culturelles, 15August 1951,
du rapport de la Commission Massey.
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which it could realize expanded cultural exchanges, and a readiness to engage
with Ottawa in this regard.19
However, French cultural action faced a number of official obstacles
across the Atlantic. Whereas Paris was a leader in cultural diplomacy, Ottawa
was much slower to act. Part of the explanation for the lag was constitutional:
pursuing a Canadian cultural diplomacy was complicated by the fact that many
aspects of cultural affairs fell under exclusively provincial or shared jurisdic-
tion. This constitutional conundrum became especially problematic after a
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ruling in 1937 effectively restricted
Ottawa’s treaty-implementing power to those matters under exclusive federal
jurisdiction.20
Added to these constitutional considerations was an institutional impediment.
In the case of Canada-France relations at least, this arose partly from a federal
awareness of the ambivalence for modern France in traditional French-Canadian
nationalist circles. The more immediate reason, however, was that cultural diplo-
macy was generally under-appreciated in an Ottawa that had only recently
developed the bureaucratic machinery for foreign affairs. The dynamic was
reflected in the marked lack of enthusiasm in the Department of External Affairs
(DEA) in 1944 when Jean Désy, Ottawa’s ambassador to Brazil and a foremost
advocate of cultural diplomacy throughout his career, negotiated Canada’s first-
ever cultural relations agreement without prior authorization. The treaty was
ratified due only to the advanced state of the talks and a fear that backing out
would offend Rio de Janeiro. When the DEA’s Information Division was estab-
lished that same year, it was given no mandate to promote cultural relations.21 This
19 For French cultural activity outside Québec, see Édouard Duc, La Langue francaise dans les
relations entre le Canada et la France (1902–1977), De la “survivance” à l’unilinguisme
français au Québec (Ph.D. diss., Université Paris IV-Sorbonne, 2007), 2, chaps. 1–2.
20 The ruling appeared to leave intact the federal treaty-making power. Greg Craven, “Federal
Constitutions and External Relations,” in Foreign Relations and Federal States, ed. Brian
Hocking (Leicester: Leicester University Press 1993), 14; Howard A. Leeson and Wilfrid V.
Vanderelst, External Affairs and Canadian Federalism: The History of a Dilemma (Toronto:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, 1973), 88.
21 John Hilliker, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Volume I: The Early Years, 1909–1946
(Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 275, 318; John Hilliker and
Donald Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Volume II: Coming of Age, 1946–1968
(Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), 10–11. When the idea of an
information division was under discussion in the DEA in 1944, it was suggested it could oper-
ate a vast cultural relations programme. Ultimately, however, the new division’s tasks remained
limited to answering inquiries from the public, press, and posts; preparing a monthly news bul-
letin primarily for the offices abroad; circulating reports and memoranda of interest to them;
arranging press conferences; and maintaining links with the National Film Board, the Wartime
Information Board, and the international service of the CBC. The Information Division received
a boost when it absorbed the Canadian Information Service (successor to the Wartime
Information Board) in 1947, but its mandate remained heavily circumscribed.
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institutional bias was also evident in the federal response to claims Paul Gouin,
Québec’s Minister of Trade and Commerce, made about the province’s duty to
promote cultural and commercial relations with Latin America. Lester Pearson,
then Minister-Counsellor at Canada’sWashington legation, conceded that Gouin’s
remarks revealed a sense in Québec that Canada’s foreign policy did not reflect
French Canada’s cultural affinities with Latin America, but he nevertheless main-
tained that it was premature to set up a cultural relations division in the DEA. The
departmental Under-Secretary, Norman Robertson, was even doubtful about
Pearson’s suggestion that as an alternative an official could be tasked to coordinate
cultural activities with the United States, United Kingdom, and Latin America.
Robertson claimed it would be difficult to convince Parliament of the value of cul-
tural diplomacy.22
Although Ottawa added a cultural and press attaché to its Paris embassy
after the war, this innovation had more to do with questions of reciprocity given
the equivalent French appointment than it did with any significant policy shift.23
Indeed, in 1946 Paul Beaulieu, Second Secretary at the Canadian Embassy,
voiced frustration that he had neither the time nor resources to develop cultural
exchanges with France, in spite of the DEA having told him that cultural rela-
tions would be his main task. Beaulieu decried the paucity of Ottawa’s effort and
urged that additional personnel be posted to Paris to pursue a more effective cul-
tural diplomacy. He warned that Canada’s unprecedented popularity in France as
a result of the war was fleeting and would be difficult to regain.24
Matters improved somewhat over the course of the 1950s. Ottawa
employed the monies that France owed it for Canadian wartime material assis-
tance to establish in 1952 the Canadian Government Overseas Awards. These
facilitated year-long sojourns in France for approximately 30 Canadian stu-
dents and artists annually.25 René Garneau, the embassy’s First Secretary, who
22 Library andArchives Canada (hereafter LAC), Department of External Affairs (hereafter DEA)
RG25, G-2, vol. 3197, 5175–40 — Letter from Pearson to Robertson, 2 June 1943; Ibid., Letter
from Robertson to Pearson, 25 June 1943. Another factor appears to have been a sense of cul-
tural insecurity, a belief that what was perceived as Canada’s cultural underdevelopment would
make cultural diplomatic efforts ineffectual if not embarrassing. In this regard, see Graham
Carr, “Non-State Actors, Border Security, and Cultural Diplomacy in Canada’s Cold War,”
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, University of
British Columbia, 2008, and Andrew Fenton Cooper, “Canadian Cultural Diplomacy: An
Introduction,” in Canadian Culture: International Dimensions, ed., Andrew Fenton Cooper
(Waterloo, Ontario: Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, University of Waterloo / Wilfrid
Laurier University, and Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), 11–2.
23 Roussel, 229.
24 LAC, DEA, G-2, vol. 3592, 2727–AD–40, 2 — Memorandum from Beaulieu to the
Ambassador, 27 May 1946.
25 Ibid., vol. 8343, 10441–AD–40, 1 — Letter from Reid, SSEA to Vanier, 27 March 1950; Ibid.,
A-4, vol. 3495, 19–1–B–1954(1), 1 — Relations between Canada and France, 18 January 1954.
To avoid constitutional difficulties, the Royal Society of Canada administered the programme.
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had responsibility for cultural and press affairs, was active in and enjoyed con-
siderable prestige among Paris intellectual circles.26 If cultural diplomacy
remained a secondary consideration in the Massey Report, it nonetheless
referred to “the promotion abroad of a knowledge of Canada” as “not a luxury
but an obligation.”27 When Ottawa subsequently acted on the Report’s recom-
mendation to establish the Canada Council for the Arts, Letters, Humanities,
and Social Sciences, the federal government equipped itself with a means to
pursue cultural diplomacy indirectly: beyond the organization’s domestic man-
date, it was also tasked with promoting Canadian culture abroad. In addition to
funding Canadian students in France, the Canada Council awarded fellowships
for French students and academics to study in Canada, and established a pro-
gramme for Canadian universities to host foreign professors.28
The overall reality, however, was that cultural diplomacy was still
accorded little official priority in Ottawa. The six years that elapsed between
the Massey Report and the establishment of the Canada Council and the fact
that its initial endowment came from private sources underscored the institu-
tional reticence that continued to exist regarding state involvement in cultural
affairs. The relative indifference in the DEA to cultural diplomacy was reflected
in the fact that Jean Désy, by the mid-1950s Canada’s ambassador to France,
appears to have acted largely on his own initiative in expanding cultural links
between France and French Canada, and had to do so with limited budgetary
resources.29 The embassy complained to the DEA about the funds it was allo-
cated for forging cultural links, emphasizing the political significance of culture
in “this country which was once very rightly described as ‘La République des
Professeurs’.”30 By the early 1960s, 39 percent or $71,000,000 of France’s for-
eign affairs budget was directed to cultural and technical cooperation, whereas
26 A Québec journalist and literary figure, Garneau had called for strengthened links between
French Canada and France before the war and went on to work for the Massey Commission.
Roussel, 230; Yvan Lamonde and Gérard Bouchard, Québécois et Américains, La culture
québécoise aux XIXe et XXe siècles (Saint-Laurent, Québec: Fides, 1995), 76.
27 Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences 1949–1951,
Report (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1951), 253–4.
28 Roussel , 186–9; LAC, DEA, G-2, vol. 5261, 8260–AD–40, 2 — Letter from Berlis to
Canadian Embassy, Paris, 18 February 1960. See Carr, and Mark Kristmanson, Plateaus of
Freedom: Nationality, Culture, and State Security in Canada, 1940–1960 (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 2003) for discussions of how Ottawa’s nascent cultural diplomacy was bound
up in Cold War security considerations.
29 Cooper, 7–8; Roussel, 231–2. The monies came from the succession duties collected from the
Dunn and Killam estates. As Cooper points out, although the Massey Report envisaged a new
role for the Canadian state as patron of the arts, it rejected the idea of a ministry of culture.
Instead, it recommended that Ottawa provide the infrastructure and financial support for the
stimulation of Canada’s cultural development at “arm’s length.”
30 LAC, DEA, G-2, vol. 4003, 10117–AD–40, 1 — Notes on the Information and Cultural
Section, Paris embassy, 13 September 1957.
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the cultural element of the DEA budget was a meagre $8,000, the majority of
this in the form of book presentations.31
In addition to the general lack of interest in cultural relations encountered
in federal circles, Paris also had to contend with an official ambivalence in
Québec City toward state involvement in cultural affairs, not least when it came
to exchanges with France. Examples of the Duplessis government’s efforts to
develop cultural links with France were conspicuous by their rarity. They
included a contribution to the postwar reconstruction of the university in
Caen.32 Although after a wartime suspension Québec City resumed its annual
$5,000 subsidy to the Maison des étudiants canadiens, a student residence at
Paris’ Cité universitaire, this support occurred more out of a sense of tradition
than any real interest in forging educational links.33
More typical was the failure of the Association canadienne-française pour
l’avancement des sciences to convince Québec City to establish bursaries to
enable French students to pursue their doctoral studies in Quebec. Similarly, the
Institut scientifique Franco-Canadien’s (ISFC) lobbying for an increased sub-
sidy fell on deaf ears, so that this remained at pre-war levels.34 Although after
a wartime interruption the Duplessis government resumed a programme estab-
lished in the 1920s to grant bursaries to students interested in studying in
Europe, minimal sums were allocated so that the programme stagnated. Further
complicating matters was the intense politicization of the system by which bur-
saries were allocated, the principal criteria being friendliness to the Duplessis
31 The French figure is somewhat misleading in that it includes monies earmarked for “technical
cooperation” (i.e., foreign aid). Nevertheless, from 1945 to the MAE’s re-organization in 1956,
when the Direction-générale des relations culturelles absorbed all of the French government’s
technical cooperation programmes, approximately 30 percent of France’s foreign affairs bud-
get was devoted to cultural relations. Conversely, in fiscal year 1961–1962, the DEA budget
amounted to $93.76 million, meaning only approximately .008 percent of the departmental
budget was specifically earmarked for cultural diplomacy. Even if one expands this amount to
include monies allocated for the Information Division, funds granted by the Canada Council,
and Ottawa’s indirect involvement in culture through the CBC, Radio-Canada and the Royal
Society of Canada, the 1963 Glassco Report on the federal civil service was correct to describe
Ottawa’s cultural diplomatic effort as pitiful. Freeman M. Tovell, “AComparison of Canadian,
French, British and German International Cultural Policies,” in Fenton Cooper; Department of
Finance, Estimates for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1963 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and
Controller of Stationery, 1962), 4; LAC, DEA, vol. 2727, A–3–C, 1 — Memorandum for the
Minister from Cadieux, Programme of Cultural Cooperation with French-Speaking Countries,
19 August 1963; Ibid., G-2, vol. 5056, 2727–AD–40, 9 — France-Canada Cultural Relations,
25 November 1963.
32 MAE, vol. 96 — Letter from Lacoste to Pineau, MAE, Amérique, 27 September 1956.
33 Roussel, 229. The subsidy was only raised to $10,000 starting in 1958–1959.
34 Ibid., 182–3. ISFC requests were refused in 1947 and 1952. Although the subsidy was finally
increased from $5,000 to $7,000 in 1953–1954, it was considerably less than requested, and
the subsidy remained at this level until the 1960s.
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government and “ideological suitability.”35 A consequence of this bias was that
a decreasing proportion of the bursaries awarded were for studies in France.36
Notwithstanding this set of official obstacles, cultural exchanges between
Canada and France did in fact grow after World War II, a trend consistent with
the larger global phenomenon of increasing transnational exchanges. The pro-
liferation — and evolution — of the cultural exchanges also reflected Québec’s
socio-cultural transformation, which becomes apparent when cultural contacts
in the private and semi-public spheres are examined.37
Cultural contacts between France and French Canada had never been com-
pletely severed after the Conquest and reflected a spectrum of political and
ideological positions. Québec’s traditionalist nationalist élites tended to distin-
guish between France éternelle and France moderne, favouring the former,
pre-1789 incarnation as an ally in maintaining French Canada’s linguistic and
religious heritage. Conversely, they condemned France moderne as a Trojan
horse for liberal and secular influences that ultimately would undermine and
destroy French-Canadian civilization.38 After 1945, however, such traditional-
35 Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Combats d’un révolutionnaire tranquille (Montréal: Centre Éducatif et
Culturel, 1989), 162; Roussel, 178; Conrad Black, Duplessis (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1977), 320. The Québec Premier’s ambivalence toward France did not prevent his
awarding bursaries to daughters of two of his ministers. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, who helped forge
the official cultural rapprochement between France and Québec, has recalled his brother being
awarded a bursary, only to be informed a portion would be withheld for cabinet minister Paul
Sauvé’s political organization. Similarly, Léon Dion, who would go on to help found Laval’s
Department of Political Science, was refused a scholarship to study in France as he attended
the university’s Social Science faculty that prominent Duplessis critic Father Georges-Henri
Lévesque headed.
36 Roussel, 34–7, 173–9. Roussel estimates that from 1945 to 1960, less than two-thirds of Québec
government bursars went to France. Another reason for the declining number of bursaries was
reduced demand: an increasing number of Québec students pursued studies in the United States,
a legacy of the wartime interruption of educational exchanges with Europe and a consequence
of the diminished prestige of the French sciences in a world marked byAmerican power. Given
the politicization of the award process, however, it is not unreasonable to speculate that certain
candidates interested in studying in France may have been dissuaded from even applying. An
additional consideration may have been financial: the scholarship programme the Québec gov-
ernment established in the interwar period remained unchanged, so that the amount awarded
remained $1,200 until 1959, when it finally was raised to $2,000.
37 Owing to space limitations, only a cursory survey of these exchanges is possible. Amore com-
prehensive examination is available in Meren, chap. 6.
38 For discussions of pre-1945 links between France and Québec, see Yvan Lamonde and Didier
Poton, eds., La Capricieuse (1855): poupe et proue, Les relations France-Québec
(1760–1914) (Montréal: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006); Lamonde, 137–66; Philippe
Prévost, La France et le Canada: D’une Après-guerre à l’Autre, 1918–1944 (Saint-Boniface,
Manitoba: Les Éditions du Blé, 1994); Michel Grenon, ed., L’image de la Révolution française
au Québec 1789–1989 (LaSalle, Québec: Éditions Hurtubise, 1989); Sylvain Simard,Mythe et
reflet de la France: l’image du Canada en France, 1850-1914 (Ottawa: Presses de l’Université
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ist links were increasingly overshadowed by more progressive, liberal contacts
between France moderne and French Canada.39 French Catholic personalist
thought, for example, with its concern to establish social and political institu-
tions to permit individuals to realize their spiritual and material potential,
inspired both the neo-nationalist and rival citélibriste challenges to the
Duplessis government, and to the traditionalist variant of French-Canadian
nationalism that both condemned as dépassé in its efforts to respond to the chal-
lenges accompanying Québec’s modernization.40 Indeed, personalism may be
described as having served as a crucial bridge between two generations and
variants of Québec nationalism, and as a key part of the intellectual foundation
of the Québec that emerged from the Quiet Revolution.41
Notwithstanding the postwar controversy over the French-sponsored col-
leges in Montréal, by the late 1940s, Paris’ representatives in Canada were
remarking on the large number of French professors the francophone universi-
ties were requesting, the numerous applicants for scholarships to study in
France, and the fact that it was in Canada (and Québec especially) that French
d’Ottawa, 1987); Roussel; Pierre Savard, “Les Canadiens français et la France de la ‘cession’
à la ‘révolution tranquille’,” in Le Canada et le Québec sur la scène internationale, ed., Paul
Painchaud (Québec: Centre québécois de relations internationales, 1977), 471–95; Louise
Beaudoin, Les relations France-Québec, deux époques, 1855–1910, 1960–1972 (M.A. thesis,
Université Laval, 1974); Centre culturel canadien, Les Relations entre la France et le Canada
aux XIXe siècle, Colloque, 26 April 1974, organized by the Centre culturel canadien, Paris,
1974; Monique Bégin, Les échanges culturels entre la France et le Canada depuis 1763: essai
d’interprétation symbolique (M.A. thesis, Université de Montréal, 1965).
39 François-Richard, 96. An early indication came during the Affaire Abadie, when Montréal’s
archbishop Monsignor Joseph Charbonneau interceded to have Le Devoir tone down its anti-
French campaign, the more liberal La Presse and Le Canada publish laudatory articles
regarding the two French colleges, and even blessed Collège Marie de France’s new location
when it opened in September 1946. This is not to suggest such traditionalist nationalist senti-
ment (and its preference for France éternelle) disappeared; Raymond Barbeau, the youthful
leader of the separatist and right-wing Alliance Laurentienne, argued the necessity for Québec
of a “Révolution nationale” (a reference to Vichy’s political programme), declaring that the
independent republic he sought would not be “libéral, athée, issue de la révolution de 1789.”
Similarly, consistent with the broader trend toward increasing transnational contacts, the
Québec intellectual right maintained fruitful contacts with more conservative French Catholic
elements. Gélinas, 110–11, 141. For further discussion of pro-France éternelle sentiment in
Québec, see John Hellman, “Monasteries, Miliciens, War Criminals: Vichy France/Quebec,
1940–1950,” Journal of Contemporary History 32, no. 4 (1997): 539–54; Yves Lavertu,
L’affaire Bernonville: Le Québec face à Pétain et à la collaboration, 1948–1951 (Montréal:
VLB éditeur, 1994).
40 Gélinas, 64–7; Gauvreau, 42–58; Alain-G. Gagnon, “André Laurendeau: The Search for
Political Equality and Social Justice,” Quebec Studies 27 (1999): 80–3; Christian Roy, “Le
personnalisme de l’ordre nouveau et le Québec (1930–1947): Son rôle dans la formation de
Guy Frégault,” Revue d’Histoire de l’Amérique française 43, no. 3 (1993): 463–84; Behiels,
20–36, 61–83.
41 In this regard, see Meunier and Warren.
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speakers touring NorthAmerica drew the largest audiences.42 In 1953, France’s
embassy boasted that the French contribution to Canadian university life had
never been so significant. In addition to academic exchanges, French professors
occupied permanent posts at Laval, Université de Montréal, McGill, Dalhousie,
Queen’s, and the University of Toronto.43
Exchanges proliferated across the artistic spectrum. These, it should be
added, were not without controversy since Québec’s cultural épanouissement
was accompanied by a shift in how francophone Québec perceived its cultural
relationship to France. There was a growing chorus in Québec for French
Canada’s unique contribution to francophone culture to be acknowledged, and
for Québec to be recognized as an equal and independent cultural producer, in
partnership with France and the broader international francophone commu-
nity.44 The fact that such frictions existed at all, however, underscores the
growth and evolution of cultural relations after 1945.
An array of associations — private and semi-public — were established to
promote transatlantic links between France and Canada, especially with French
Canada. In addition to the long-established Alliance française, which saw the
number of its branches in Canada grow after the war, was the Union Culturelle
Française (UCF), which originated in Québec in 1954 to promote the interna-
tional defence of the French language and culture and sought to involve all
groups and territories in which French was the principal or secondary language.
The UCF, spearheaded by neo-nationalist personality Jean-Marc Léger, was
born out of growing concern about the international status of the French lan-
guage and culture in the face of American cultural influence, coupled with a
belief that these could be used to connect populations.45
42 MAE, vol. 66 — Letter from Gay to MAE, Relations Culturelles, 1 March 1949, ci-joint Note
du Conseiller Culturel sur l’enseignement français au Canada. Among the students who visited
France was Pierre Trudeau. A useful discussion of his time in Paris and the French-Canadian
community in the French capital may be found in John English, Citizen of the World: The Life
of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, volume one: 1919–1968 (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2006),
144–9. Also in this regard, see Gérard Pelletier, Souvenirs: Les années d’impatience,
1950–1960 (Montréal: Stanké, 1983), 37–8. Pelletier emphasizes the importance of going to
Paris for members of his generation, describing the city as their intellectual point of reference.
43 MAE, vol. 170 — Letter from de Laboulaye, Chargé d’Affaires, A.I., to Bidault, MAE,
Relations Culturelles, 29 July 1953, Rapport annuel du Service Culturel; Ibid., vol. 99 —
Visite de M. Saint Laurent, 7–10 février 1954 — Chef du Gouvernement Canadien; Ibid., vol.
171 — Action Culturelle de la France au Canada, 28 February 1957. Three years later, it was
estimated that 25 French nationals held permanent posts in Canadian universities.
44 Roussel, 170–1, 252–3.
45 MAE, vol. 175 — Letter from Guérin to Pinay, MAE, Relations Culturelles, 3 May 1955,
Union culturelle française (section Canada); Jean-Marc Léger, Le Temps dissipé: souvenirs
(Montréal: Éditions Hurtubise HMH, 1999), 368–71; François-Richard, 28–39; Roussel,
264–5.
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The growth of tourism facilitated cultural contacts. In 1963, 100,000
Canadians visited France, representing an annual growth rate since 1950 of 12
percent, with half this number from Québec, often French Canadians tracing
their ancestral roots.46 Even more significant, however, was the expansion of
the mass media; indépendantiste André d’Allemagne claimed that for all of its
“refrancisation” campaigns, the Société Saint-Jean Baptiste’s efforts paled in
comparison to the impact of the postwar influx of French-language detective
novels, films, and magazines.47
A result of the increasing cultural contacts was the emergence in Québec
of an expanding community interested in establishing a more substantive cul-
tural cooperation with France. Paradoxically, the global trend toward increased
transnational flows that was producing this outcome carried with it a more
defensive impetus that reinforced the drive to develop links. The growth of
transnational influences provoked worries that these threatened national cul-
tures and identities, and fed a determination to preserve cultural specificity in a
period of profound change. Since the United States constituted the foremost
cultural power by virtue of its enhanced geo-political and economic strength, its
role as the centre of the mass media-driven popular culture, and Washington’s
own cultural diplomacy, it was the object of particular nationalist anxiety as
reactions against Americanization that were already apparent in the interwar
period intensified after 1945.48 For the sake of the present discussion,
Americanization may be understood as the advent of a consumer society in the
image of the United States, entailing the influx of American cultural products
from jazz to rock music and Hollywood films. The phenomenon was especially
pronounced among the younger generations and the popular classes, making
the corollary of Americanization — anti-Americanism — the purview predom-
inantly of socio-economic and cultural élites. The nationalist reactions on both
sides of the Atlantic were thus partly a response to what today is referred to as
globalization, what international relations scholar Peter J. Taylor has described
as the “final expression” of the “American century,” and a barometer of the
United States’ hegemonic cycle, the cultural attributes of which were insepara-
ble from its geo-political and economic components.49
46 MAE, vol. 171 — Annual Report, Cultural Service, French embassy, Ottawa, 31 July 1957;
Pierre-Yves Pépin, “Les relations économiques franco-canadiennes: données récentes et pers-
pectives,” in L’Actualité Économique 40, no. 3 (1964): 487.
47 André d’Allemagne, Le colonialisme au Québec (Montréal: Les éditions R-B, 1966), 116.
48 Iriye, 81–2, 157–8. For further discussion of the rise of American cultural diplomacy, see
Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural
Expansion, 1890–1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), Frank A. Ninkovich, The
Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981).
49 Taylor, 50–4.
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Such nationalist preoccupations were on display at the time of the centenary
of the 1855 visit to British North America of the French ship, La Capricieuse,
commemorating what is remembered as the resumption of official contact
between France and its former colony.50 During the celebrations Québec’s
Solicitor-General, Antoine Rivard, compared Québec’s cultural survival to that
of the French Resistance in World War II. He went on to warn that French cul-
ture in Québec was at risk due to French Canadians’ “promiscuité” with the
United States. Rivard argued that contacts with France were, consequently, “plus
que jamais nécessaires” to ensuring the survival of French Canada as a popula-
tion that maintained French cultural traditions. The French diplomat attending
the event found Rivard’s remarks particularly significant as they represented a
rare public affirmation by a senior member of the Duplessis government, known
in French official circles for its antipathy for France moderne, of the need to
maintain relations with France as a means to counter American influence.51
The French diplomat’s surprise over Rivard’s remarks underscores their
exceptional nature and, more broadly, the Duplessis government’s preference for
passivity. Calls came from across the nationalist spectrum for Québec City to
abandon its laisser-faire approach and become more active in cultural affairs to
ensure French Canada’s cultural survival.52 The report of the Tremblay Com-
mission, described as the most succinct response of traditionalist French-Canadian
nationalism to Québec’s post-war socio-economic challenges in its analysis of the
province’s position in Confederation, called upon the Duplessis government that
had appointed it to take a more activist approach in cultural affairs.53 Léopold
50 For discussions of the growth of nationalist anxiety in Québec about the United States, see
Lamonde and Bouchard, and Richard A. Jones, “French Canada and the American Peril in the
Twentieth Century,” The American Review of Canadian Studies 14, no. 3 (Fall 1984): 333–50.
51 MAE, vol. 95 — Letter from de Vial, Consul Général de France à Québec, to MAE,Amérique,
23 July 1955, Commémoration de l’Arrivée de la Capricieuse; Ibid., vol. 176 — Letter from
Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 29 January 1952, célébration du Centenaire de
l’Université Laval à Québec; Ibid., vol. 44 — Letter from Guérin to Schuman.
52 Gélinas, 221–2, 336–9, 356. Gélinas notes that state involvement in cultural affairs was gen-
erally not a priority for the intellectual right in Québec, reflecting the attitude of Québec’s
political leaders and public opinion (and, it may be added, the broader Canadian position).
Traditional nationalists’ approach to the state’s role in cultural affairs points to the larger ques-
tion of their position on the role of the state in society. Recent works have qualified the more
traditional nationalists’ antipathy for an activist state that the established Québec historiogra-
phy has alleged. If serious differences existed over the exact measures to be taken, there was
a clear desire to see the Québec state assume its regulatory function and intervene in the
province’s social, economic, and cultural life (in a manner consistent with the social doctrine
of the Catholic Church), to respond to the challenges of industrialization and urbanization, and
to safeguard the future of the French-Canadian nation.
53 Dominique Foisy-Geoffroy, “Le rapport de la commission Tremblay (1953–1956): Testament
politique de la pensée traditionaliste canadienne-française,” Revue d’histoire de L’Amérique
française 60, no. 3 (2007): 257–94; Roussel, 153–5, 180–3, 225–7.
294
JOURNAL OF THE CHA 2008 REVUE DE LA S.H.C.
Richer, editor of the journal Notre Temps, called in 1953 for a government
agency that would promote the use of French in Québec, anticipating the Office
de la langue française established eight years later, as did the urgings of Paul
Gouin, the former Québec Liberal cabinet minister, for the Duplessis govern-
ment to set up an Office de linguistique et de refrancisation. In a similar vein,
the “Ministère de l’Information” that the journal Tradition et Progrès proposed
in 1959 found its echo in the Lesage government’s Ministère des Affaires cul-
turelles.54
Surveying the growth of nationalist apprehensions about Québec’s
Americanization, Gérard Bouchard and Yvan Lamonde have noted how the war
years and the post-1945 period saw a widening of a cleavage that had existed
since the late eighteenth century between a bourgeois nationalist élite more cul-
turally-oriented toward France, and the popular classes, oriented toward the
United States. The preoccupation with the threat of Americanization tran-
scended divisions within the nationalist ranks, so that Abbé Lionel Groulx’s
claim in 1941 that one day history would recognize the accomplishment of
French Canada’s resisting “le continentalisme américain,” found its echo a
decade later in André Laurendeau’s warning of the “danger mortel” of the
United States’ “influence uniformisante,” and in the leftist radicalism of Parti
pris in the 1960s.55
Where differences among Québec nationalists arose was the question of
which incarnation of France might assist the preservation of French Canada’s
cultural specificity in the face of Americanization. Traditionalists such as
Groulx evinced a deep suspicion of France moderne, seeing in its secular lib-
eralism a threat as great as that of English Canada and the United States.
Québec neo-nationalists, however, encouraged by ideological affinities and the
postwar proliferation of cultural links, were more open to France moderne, see-
ing in it a useful and necessary ally as Québec adapted to its increasingly
urbanized, industrialized reality and contended with transnational influences.
The francophone urban proletariat was to be protected from Americanization
and assimilation into the North American anglophone majority by a greater
communion between Québec moderne and its French counterpart. Even before
the war, neo-nationalist historian Guy Frégault, who would serve as the first
deputy minister of Québec’s fledgling Ministère des Affaires culturelles,
expressed a desire to see restored to French-Canadians “‘le sentiment de con-
tact intime, de vibration fraternelle avec le reste de la nation française,” and
54 Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec (hereafter BAnQ), E4, 1960–01–483, vol. 436,
Conseil Culturel du Québec, Le Conseil Culturel du Québec (projet), Paul Gouin, 25 October
1952; Gélinas, 356–7.
55 Lamonde and Bouchard, 70–86; Yvan Lamonde, “Le Regard sur les États-Unis: Le Révélateur
d’un clivage social dans la culture nationale québécoise,” Journal of Canadian Studies 30, no.
1 (1995): 69–73.
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condemned traditional nationalists for failing to recognize the necessity of
cooperation between Québec and France.56 In this sense, the neo-nationalist
embrace of France moderne mirrored that of the traditional nationalist turn to
France éternelle: both entailed a nationalist élite pursuing its self-appointed
mission of preserving the integrity of Québec’s francophone culture.57
France’s ambassador, Francis Lacoste, suggested that the Congrès de la
Refrancisation in 1957, convened by the Conseil de la Vie française to discuss
the status of French in North America and, more specifically, increase its stature
in Québec, was a barometer of the evolution of Québec attitudes toward France,
given that at the height of the traditional nationalist order, French Canadians fre-
quently affirmed that the quality of French spoken in Québec was purer than its
Parisian equivalent. Lacoste suggested that for Québec’s intelligentsia at least,
concern to preserve the French language was inspiring calls for a greater cultural
rapprochement.58 Similarly indicative of the mounting nationalist pressure on the
Duplessis government to develop cultural exchanges with France were the calls
for a Québec office in Paris. Amid a public debate over low levels of francophone
immigration to Canada in the early 1950s, Le Devoir and the Fédération des
Sociétés Saint-Jean Baptiste du Québec urged the establishment of a Paris office
to inter alia encourage francophone immigration to Québec.59 Paul Gouin pre-
vailed on Québec City to take responsibility for promoting French-Canadian
culture overseas by appointing an agent to the French capital, arguing that
although Ottawa had appointed a French-Canadian cultural attaché to its embassy
and planned to do the same in Brussels, these individuals were, by virtue of their
appointment, “fédéralistes” who represented an attack on Québec’s autonomy.60
56 Roy, 470–3. Consistent with neo-nationalisms’ intellectual ties with France, Frégault in the
1930s was especially interested in realizing a cooperation between France and Québec to
implement the precepts of personalism on both sides of the Atlantic.
57 Gélinas, 103; Yvan Lamonde, Ni avec eux ni sans eux: Le Québec et les États-Unis (Québec:
Nuit Blanche, 1996), 89–90.
58 MAE, vol. 171 — Letter from Lacoste to Pineau, MAE, Amérique, 17 July 1957, “Sa Majesté
la Langue Française”; Marcel Martel, Le deuil d’un pays imaginé (Ottawa: Les Presses de
l’Université d’Ottawa, 1997), 85. It was also a barometer of the evolution toward a more
Québec-centric nationalism, given that the preoccupation was to “refranciser” Québec.
59 MAE, vol. 179 — Letter from de Laboulaye, Chargé d’Affaires, a.i., au Canada, to Schuman,
MAE, ConventionsAdministratives et Sociales, 30 September 1952, L’opinion canadienne et l’im-
migration française; Ibid., vol. 179 — Letter from de Vial, Consul Général de France à Québec, to
MAE, Amérique, 26 October 1953, Immigration des Français dans la Province de Québec.
60 BAnQ, E4, 1960–01–483, vol. 436, Conseil Culturel du Québec, Le Conseil Culturel du
Québec (projet), Paul Gouin, 25 October 1952. Gouin envisaged this attaché as taking respon-
sibility for Québec students, promoting French-Canadian culture, gathering information for the
Office d’Urbanisme and an Office de linguistique et de refrancisation he urged be established;
he also proposed acquiring works of art and archival documents, and seeking out French pro-
fessors for Québec’s post-secondary institutions. Gouin anticipated the cultural activities of the
Québec Delegation-General that opened in Paris in 1961.
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There were also repeated calls in the Québec legislature, not least from the
Francophile leader of the opposition, Georges-Émile Lapalme, who argued for
increased cultural links with France as a means to strengthen Québec’s majority
francophone culture.61
The growth of Québec nationalist sentiment favouring a more activist
Québec state that would forge a stronger cooperation with France as part of its
broader cultural vocation to protect and promote North America’s fait français
set the stage for a conflict between Ottawa and Québec City that, ultimately,
would involve Paris. This arose from the fact that Canadian nationalist worries
over Americanization were pushing Ottawa to adopt a more activist position in
the cultural sphere. Although “high culture” flowered in Canada after 1945,
American popular culture gained a “veritable stranglehold,” as new technolo-
gies, a weakening British cultural presence, and the English-Canadian cultural
élite’s dismissal of popular culture meant Canadians were exposed to (and
embraced) American cultural influences as never before. This fuelled English-
Canadian nationalist apprehension about the survival of a Canadian identity
distinct from that of the United States.62
Such nationalist concern, visible in the first half of the twentieth century in
response to the influx of American periodicals, radio, and film, had prompted
Ottawa to establish the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.63 After the war,
the Massey Report reflected this nationalism and a cultural anti-Americanism
in warning of “the onset of a purely ‘materialistic society,’ the rise of ‘mass’
man, and the decline of the West into a debased state of passivity and confor-
mity.”64 Paul Rutherford has described the idealized vision that continued to
exist among the English-Canadian intelligentsia of the British cultural metro-
pole, which was held up as the means to combat American popular culture, as
evidenced by the British ties to the Royal Winnipeg Ballet and the Stratford
Festival, and the fact that the Massey Commission (with its eponymous
anglophile co-chair) was inspired by the example of the British Arts Council in
61 Georges-Émile Lapalme, Le vent de l’oubli, Mémoires, volume II (Montréal: Leméac 1970),
238–9; Roussel, 227.
62 Allan Smith, “From Guthrie to Greenberg: Canadian High Culture and the End of Empire,” in
Canada and the End of Empire, ed., Phillip Buckner (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2005), 212; Paul Rutherford, “The Persistence of Britain: The Culture Project
in Postwar Canada,” in Buckner, 195; J.M. Bumsted, “Canada and American Culture in the
1950s,” in Interpreting Canada’s Past, v. II, After Confederation, ed., J.M. Bumsted (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 399–401.
63 John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent
Allies, 3rd ed. (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 115–26.
64 Rutherford, 198–9. Also, Philip Massolin, Canadian Intellectuals, the Tory Tradition, and the
Challenge of Modernity, 1939–1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), Paul Litt,
The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1992).
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recommending that Ottawa establish the Canada Council. Mirroring the
dynamic evident among the various nationalist communities in Québec, there
was a convergence of nationalist opinion in English Canada regarding the
American challenge. Aspects of the conservative nationalism oriented towards
Britain that figures such as George Grant espoused served as a crucial part of
the foundation for the left-nationalism that emerged in the 1950s and beyond
and which decried American “cultural imperialism.”65
Just as the more traditional variant of French-Canadian nationalism was
increasingly overshadowed by its more progressive rivals, so too was its
English-Canadian counterpart. Inspired not least by the growth of American
cultural influence, there was after WorldWar II an increasing English-Canadian
appreciation of French Canada as a point of differentiation for Canada’s iden-
tity and a shield against Americanization. The Toronto Daily Star referred in
1951 to an emerging distinct Canadian way of life that drew on characteristics
of “our two great races, the English and French.”66 Similarly, Vincent Massey
considered Canada’s bicultural dimension a source of strength distinguishing
the country from the United States.67 The result was an enhanced prominence
in English-Canadian nationalist thinking of the view that an activist federal
government was necessary to promote Canada’s two founding cultures, since a
dynamic biculturalism offered the best defence against American influences,
the greatest prospect for a distinctly Canadian cultural life, and more generally
a vehicle for the promotion of national unity.
Some in Québec, such as Father Georges-Henri Lévesque, the de facto co-
chair of the Massey Commission and the Dean of Université Laval’s Faculty of
Social Sciences, advocated this position, arguing that Québec and French
65 For a discussion of the conservative variant of English-Canadian nationalism and its contribu-
tion to the postwar evolution of Canadian nationalism and anti-Americanism, see Massolin.
66 Igartua, 98, 104–7. As was the case with Québec nationalism, the more conservative, anglo-
centric strain of English-Canadian nationalism did not simply disappear, as evidenced by the
controversies over the dropping of the term “Dominion,” the adoption of a distinctive
Canadian flag, and, more generally, the fear that the failure of Canada’s two “races” to blend
into one made Canada an “incomplete” nation. The Calgary Herald in 1952 warned that aban-
doning Canada’s symbolic ties with Britain (blamed, it should be noted, on Québec
nationalism) would promote Canada’s drift into the American orbit. Such arguments were
reflected in John Diefenbaker’s subsequent calls for “One Canada.”
67 Karen Anne Phibbs-Finlay, The Force of Culture: Vincent Massey and Canadian Sovereignty
(Ph.D. diss., University of Victoria, 1999), 309–10. George Grant described French Canada as
the keystone of the Canadian nation, bemoaning Diefenbaker’s “One Canada” concept as failing
to acknowledge French-Canadian communal rights, and thus ignoring what he described as the
historic basis of Canadian nationalism. George Grant, Lament for a Nation (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart, 1965), 21. This line of argument was subsequently echoed by Marcel Rioux and
Susan Crean’s call in Deux pays pour vivre, un plaidoyer (Laval: Éditions coopératives Albert
Saint-Martin, 1980) for some form of sovereignty-association as the best defence for the
Québecois and English-Canadian nations to protect themselves from American influence.
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Canada were not synonymous, so that Ottawa had an obligation to foster
Canada’s bicultural reality.68 But this view of the federal government’s role in
Canada’s cultural life remained hotly contested in Québec. The increase in
Ottawa’s cultural action in response to the Massey Report and the growth of
English-Canadian nationalist sentiment, such as its decision to provide funding
to Canadian universities, provoked a strong resistance, with Québec nationalists
viewing it as a dangerous encroachment on provincial jurisdiction. The conflict
arose from the nebulous treatment accorded culture under the British North
America Act. The responsibility for culture as such was not assigned to any one
level of government, although the provinces were given exclusive jurisdiction
over education. The outcome of the Radio Reference (1932) established a fed-
eral competence in communications and, after the war, Ottawa acted on the
Massey Report’s recommendation that it use the constitution’s residual powers
clause (assigned to the federal government) to justify further cultural action.
Québec nationalists of all stripes considered federal cultural activities and the
justification offered for them to be illegitimate, regardless of whether they took
place in Canada or abroad. This view was founded on their belief that the spirit,
if not the very text of Canada’s constitution, made culture an exclusive provin-
cial jurisdiction. As Michael Behiels has observed, the crux of the issue was a
dispute over which level of government could best ensure the survival and well-
being of French and English Canada in the face of the American challenge.69
Québec nationalists rejected Georges-Henri Lévesque’s position in favour
of federal cultural activism on behalf of biculturalism as naïve; although quite
ready to acknowledge that Americanization presented a serious challenge to
French Canada’s cultural specificity, nationalists of all stripes argued that it by
no means justified ceding any Québec autonomy. To the contrary, notwithstand-
ing a growing English-Canadian appreciation for Canada’s fait français, it was
unthinkable for nationalists that Québec should turn over even the smallest mea-
sure of its cultural development to federal institutions controlled by the
anglophone majority; French Canadians had no choice but to confide the main-
tenance, defence, and expansion of their culture to their national government
located in Québec City, not Ottawa. Canada’s two nationalist reactions to
Americanization, and the two levels of government under pressure to take a
more activist approach to combat this phenomenon, were on a collision course.70
68 Behiels, 207–8.
69 Ibid., 206–8;BAnQ, P422, S2, 1995–01–008, vol. 2, 2 — Mémoire à l’intention de Monsieur
Guy Frégault, sous-ministre des Affaires culturelles, from Jacques-Yvan Morin, undated (ca.
1965).
70 Gélinas, 306, 316; Behiels, 206–8. This dynamic was foreshadowed in the 1930s amid
Ottawa’s early forays into the cultural sphere. See Mary Vipond, “One Network or Two?
French-language Programming on the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, 1932–36,”
The Canadian Historical Review 89, no. 3 (September 2008): 319–43.
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Accordingly, nationalist calls for the Duplessis government to take a more
activist role in cultural affairs were inspired to a significant extent out of a con-
cern to assert Québec’s autonomy in the face of federal initiatives and thereby
safeguard the province’s majority francophone identity. Consistent with its ori-
gins as the Duplessis government’s rejoinder to the centralizing tendencies of
the federally-appointed Rowell-Sirois and Massey Commissions, the report of
the Tremblay Commission, mandated to produce Québec’s position on the
appropriate division of fiscal resources and constitutional powers in Canada,
urged Québec City to act in the cultural sphere in order to combat federal
encroachments.71 Paul Gouin warned the Duplessis government that Ottawa
was going to award monies to Québec cultural and artistic societies, making it
essential to establish a Québec Cultural Council that could respond to the fed-
eral intervention.72
These competing Québec and Canadian nationalist responses, and the
increasingly rancorous intergovernmental rivalry they fuelled, possessed seri-
ous implications as they intersected with the French nationalist response to
Americanization. French concerns about the rising American power had been
evident in the latter decades of the nineteenth century and transcended the
country’s political and ideological cleavages; Philippe Roger has described
anti-Americanism as a rare unifying force in French political and intellectual
life. The weakened position in which France found itself during the interwar
period relative to the rising United States exacerbated the situation so that
French cultural nationalism shifted from a sense of superiority to take on an
increasingly defensive hue.73
This French antipathy for American cultural influences grew after 1945 in
the face of preponderant American power, so that the interest in cultivating cul-
tural relations emanating from the Canadian side of the Atlantic met with a
sympathetic response. Paris was, as observed above, expanding its cultural
diplomacy as a means to preserve what was perceived as France’s role as a cul-
tural leader and model and, through its rayonnement, to compensate for the
country’s weakened geo-political and economic position relative to the United
States. Beyond this, however, was a broader cultural anti-Americanism among
71 Roussel, 225–7.
72 BAnQ, E4, 1960–01–483, vol. 436, Le Conseil Culturel du Québec (projet), Paul Gouin, 25
October 1952.
73 Roger, 122, 141. See chaps. 1–10 for a discussion of the evolution of French anti-Americanism
prior to 1945. Roger refers to the mentality of the “Other Maginot Line” (a telling metaphor)
that emerged among (predominantly) French right-wing intellectuals in the face of American
cultural influences in the interwar period. See also Robert O. Paxton, “Anti-Americanism in
the Years of Collaboration and Resistance,” in The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: a
Century of French Perception, eds., Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie France Toinet,
trans. Gerry Turner (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 55–63.
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the French intelligentsia, political class, and even public opinion.74 As the
1950s progressed and the reality of France’s Americanization was increasingly
apparent, a debate about the socio-cultural impact suffused the country’s intel-
lectual and political life. Across the political spectrum, the question was
whether France’s national identity could surviveAmericanization. Works such as
CyrilleArnavon’s Américanisme et nouswarned against the colonizing aspects of
American culture, and even an avowed Atlanticist and champion of modern-
ization such as Raymond Aron expressed strong misgivings about France’s
ability to maintain its cultural specificity.75 With the French Right in eclipse as
a result of the war, it was the Left that became heir to the anti-American tradi-
tion, recalling the dynamic present among the nationalist communities in
Canada. What was at stake was “Frenchness,” an idealized France that stood in
stark contrast and radical opposition to the “AmericanWay of Life.” Even those
aspects of American culture embraced enthusiastically in France, such as jazz,
“rock n’ roll,” westerns, even Jerry Lewis, were manifestations of a concern
about Americanization as they appeared at the time, dissident or subversive
within American culture — that is, un-American.76
Paris’ disquiet about American cultural influence in Canada and its interest
in the opportunities this presented for the development of Canada-France rela-
tions were evident shortly after the war, and were by no means restricted to
French Canada. The embassy reported on growing English-Canadian interest in
Western Europe as a response to the challenge of Americanization.77 France’s
diplomats similarly remarked that with the traditional nationalist antipathy
toward France increasingly in eclipse, there was emerging a shared desire
among the élites of both of Canada’s linguistic communities for stronger coop-
eration with France, reinforced by a mutual concern to defend againstAmerican
cultural influence.78 The embassy warned, however, of a growing disconnect
74 Roger, 324; Kuisel, 37–69; Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1946–1958 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 435–45; Alfred Grosser, Affaires extérieures, la politique
de la France, 1944–1984 (Paris: Flammarion, 1984), 221–2.
75 Kuisel, 108–13, 124–30; Irwin M. Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France,
1945–1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 113–36; Michael M. Harrison,
“FrenchAnti-Americanism under the 4th Republic and the Gaullist Solution,” in Lacorne, Rupnik,
and Toinet, eds., 169–78; Cyrille Arnavon, L’Américanisme et nous (Paris: Del Duca, 1958).
76 Roger, 341, 411–2. Roger writes that “[t]he idealized France was … a place of relative equal-
ity (sans-culotte style) and organic solidarities (every populist movement’s greatest dream). It
was a France in which conflict did not imply unqualified rifts. In which contact between social
or ethnic groups was not broken like in America, with its slums and ghettos. In which every-
one still spoke the same language and talk circulated and created bonds.”
77 MAE, vol. 66 — Letter from Gay to MAE, Relations Culturelles, 1 March 1949, ci-joint Note
du Conseiller Culturel sur l’enseignement français au Canada.
78 Ibid., vol. 62 — Letter from Basdevant, Charge d’Affaires ad interim de l’Ambassade de
France to Schuman, MAE, Relations Culturelles, 28 June 1950, Commission d’enquête sur l’a-
vancement des Arts, Sciences et Lettres au Canada.
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between Canada’s intellectual élite, francophone and anglophone, and a general
population affected profoundly by American culture.79
French officials evinced specific concern about Québec’s Americanization.
The MAE, which had deemed it essential for cultural and economic reasons
that French films regain and develop the market position they had lost to the
United States’ film industry during the war, was concerned at the end of the
1940s as Québec audiences continued to prefer American films. Similarly trou-
bling for French representatives in Canada was the influence of the United
States’ intellectual life in the Québec university community, the prolific flow of
American books into the province, and the fact that an increasing number of
Québec students were opting for studies south of the border.80 France’s
embassy feared that in many respects, the general French-Canadian population
was even more susceptible to American influences than its anglophone coun-
terpart given that the former did not possess the British and Irish connections
through which American cultural influence was refracted in English Canada.81
By the mid-1950s, the French embassy’s cultural service could remark on
French Canada’s “rapide évolution de la mentalité,” as earlier debates in
Québec over the desirability of intellectual ties with France that marked tradi-
tionalist nationalist ambivalence for France moderne had been overtaken by an
almost total acceptance of French intellectual life and of cultural contacts as an
invaluable source of support for French Canada. Paris was told that the fore-
most debate in Quebec cultural life arose from the efforts among French
Canada’s élites to reconcile traditional and modern Québec, with the intellec-
tual élite displaying a marked preference for French culture over
Americanization. French diplomats emphasized, however, that this growing
avant-garde, wishing to purify French-Canadian culture through more intense
contact with France was increasingly alienated from the wider population that
accepted its Americanization.82
*****
In 1959, an official of Canada’s embassy in Lima encountered France’s new
Minister of Culture, the famed intellectual André Malraux, at a dinner held in
his honour in the Peruvian capital. Malraux spoke to the official of France’s
79 Ibid., vol. 171 — Rapport annuel 1955–1956, Cultural Service, French embassy, Ottawa, 19
September 1956.
80 Ibid., vol. 63 — Letter from MAE to Minister of Information, Direction Générale de la
Cinématographie, 4 July 1945, Diffusion des films français au Canada; Ibid., vol. 41 — Note
from del Perugia, Gérant le Consulat Général de France à Québec, MAE, Amérique, 21 May
1949, Influence des Etats-Unis dans la Province de Québec.
81 Ibid., vol. 171 — Rapport annuel, Cultural Service, French embassy, Ottawa, 31 July 1957.
82 Ibid., vol. 170 — Copie du Rapport annuel du Service Culturel de l’Ambassade, from
Ambassador of France to Canada, to MAE, Amérique, 26 July 1954.
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deep interest in Canada and desire to expand cultural relations; the Canadian
came away from the conversation with the impression that France was under-
taking a “vast cultural offensive” of which Canada would be a significant part.83
The following year, during his 1960 visit to Canada, de Gaulle praised French-
Canadian survival and success as a cultural entity. The General, reflecting the
French cultural nationalist preoccupations about American cultural power that
had been growing in the aftermath of WorldWar II, emphasized in Montréal the
significance he attached to French Canada’s will to survive:
[c]e que vous êtes est très important, pour le Canada bien entendu, pour la
France aussi … et j’ajoute, pour le Monde, car il est essentiel, vous le sentez
tous, qu’il y eût, sur cet immense continent Américain, une entité Française
vivante. Une pensée Française, qui dure, qui est indispensable pour que tout
ne se confonde pas dans une sorte d’uniformité .… [La France] a besoin de
sentir et de savoir que son rayonnement s’étend, qu’elle trouve des échos, des
appuis partout et qu’elle en trouve principalement chez ceux qui viennent
d’elle-même.84 (emphasis added)
These senior French personalities’ remarks were consistent with Paris’
abiding and growing interest in Canada, especially French Canada and its sur-
vival as a cultural entity. This interest was symptomatic of a broader French
concern about American cultural strength; if increased transnational exchanges
had led to increased cultural contacts, they had also fuelled nationalist concern
about the implications for the rayonnement of French culture at home and
abroad. Two years before de Gaulle had even returned to power in 1958, the
MAE had been reorganized to give greater prominence and resources to
France’s cultural diplomatic efforts. By the late 1950s, Paris found itself faced
with two interested (and increasingly competing) interlocutors, one in Ottawa
and the other in Québec City. While this certainly held out the prospect of
expanded cultural relations, French diplomacy had to determine how it was to
conduct its cultural activity in Canada. The nationalist sentiment surrounding
cultural affairs and encouraging more substantive intergovernmental relations
meant that such exchanges, and the manner by which they were to be con-
ducted, were poised to became a source of dispute, and ultimately, of triangular
tensions as the Quiet Revolution unfolded. Indeed, de Gaulle came away from
his 1960 visit determined to expand cultural relations with French Canada.85
83 LAC, DEA, G-2, vol. 7069, 7839–40, 3 — Despatch No. 225 (1959) from Canadian
Ambassador, Lima, Peru, to SSEA.
84 MAE, vol. 100 — Allocution Prononcée par le Général de Gaulle à la fin du Banquet offert
par la Ville de Montréal à l’Hôtel Queen Elisabeth, le vendredi, 21 avril 1960.
85 Ibid., vol. 87 — Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 23 January 1961, cf. Letter de M.
Roger Seydoux à Lacoste, 17 May 1960; LAC, DEA, G-2 , vol. 3197, 5175–40 — Telex from
Dupuy to Cadieux, 3 June 1961.
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Indicative of the presidential interest and anticipating the subsequent triangular
tensions, the MAE accordingly reorganized France’s cultural representation in
Canada in a manner weighted more heavily toward Québec.86
French nationalists were by no means alone in their preoccupations about
Uncle Sam. Concern about Americanization was a transatlantic phenomenon as
nationalist preoccupations among both Canada’s francophone and anglophone
populations about American cultural influence encouraged interest in cultivat-
ing links with France. This was especially the case among Québec
neo-nationalists, more inclined to see such links as essential to Québec main-
taining its majority francophone identity amid its socio-cultural transformation.
A consequence of these three growing — and interacting — nationalist
reactions was an increasing governmental involvement in cultural affairs.
Malraux’s appointment as France’s first Minister of Culture reflected the trend,
as did the centrality of culture in French diplomacy after World War II. Even in
Canada, where constitutional and institutional obstacles meant the trend was
somewhat delayed, there was growing pressure on governments to act in the
cultural sphere. Notwithstanding the discourse of the “two solitudes” of the
period, elements in English and French Canada both harboured nationalist con-
cerns about Americanization, and a desire to see the state take steps to
counteract American cultural influence.
If Canada’s parallel nationalist anxieties could find some common ground
regarding the challenge that American cultural power posed, they quickly
parted company when it came to solutions over exactly which state they wanted
to see act. Individuals such as Georges-Henri Lévesque, who called for a fed-
eral activism in Canadian cultural life, were a small, embattled minority in a
Québec in which neo-nationalism was in the ascendant. Ottawa’s increasing
cultural activity in the postwar period had proved not only a source of conflict
with the Duplessis government; it had fuelled nationalist calls for Québec City
to pursue a more activist policy to safeguard Québec’s autonomy in cultural
affairs and, by implication, French Canada’s survival.
The efforts to equip the Québec government as French Canada’s “national”
state, to protect and promote North America’s fait français in an increasingly
interdependent world, would find an enthusiastic partner in Paris in the 1960s.
Gaullist France was preoccupied with contesting American power on all fronts,
86 The French cultural attaché in Ottawa was transferred to a new cultural office in Montréal and
a second attaché appointed to Québec City; both attachés were to work under the authority of
the embassy’s cultural counsellor, who remained in Ottawa. Despite the remonstrations of the
DEA, no new cultural attachés were appointed outside Québec. MAE, vol. 87 — Telegram
from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 23 January 1961; Ibid., vol. 87 — Note from Basdevant to
Couve de Murville, 27 January 1961, Création d’un poste d’attaché culturel à Montréal; Ibid.,
vol. 87 — Letter from Basdevant, MAE, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, to Lacoste, 6
February 1961, Organisation de notre représentation culturelle au Canada.
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not least in the cultural domain, and, consistent with this, was concerned that
Québec should maintain its majority francophone cultural identity as it mod-
ernized. When such concerns combined with a growing French belief that
Québec was evolving toward a new political status, the result would be a series
of cultural relations agreements between Paris and Québec City that were of
expanding scope and an increasingly official nature. Determined to safeguard
its prerogative over the conduct of foreign affairs and to assert its role in cul-
tural diplomacy, Ottawa would strive to ensure that France-Québec cultural
cooperation was carried out in a manner respecting federal authority. The
rivalry between Ottawa and Québec City in cultural affairs — and between
English-Canadian nationalism and Québec nationalism — already apparent in
the 1950s would thus be internationalized as Paris was increasingly drawn into
(and joined) the fray, and Gaullist nationalism and Québec neo-nationalism
cooperated to realize their respective agendas. Cultural relations would become
a driving force of the triangular tensions that were a crucial precursor to de
Gaulle’s 1967 visit, during which he called for transatlantic francophone soli-
darity in the face of American cultural power, thereby setting off a new
nationalist furor over French influence in Canada.
* * *
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